This paper explores a number of dimensions of the accountability processes of governments. Accountability is associated with giving reasons for conduct for responsibilities or authority granted. A key argument of this paper is that governments make themselves accountable but only in a political, rather than managerial, sense resulting in, paradoxically, increasing, rather than decreasing, forms of control over society. Due to their unique position in society, where their very existence is dependent upon them exercising control over other parts of society, anything they do has a controlling outcome. Couple this with a lack of day by day control by the voting public, who have power to elect these bodies in western democracies but not a power to dictate practical action, leaves governments in a uniquely powerful position. The accountability of governments is caught in this dynamic. The very process of governments making themselves politically accountable leads to forms of control. Increasing detail in the accountability of governments, often caused by pressure and concern from the voting public, leads to increasing forms of control being exercised. Partly to avoid the searching questions from the public, resulting in more detailed forms of political accountability, and, following the logic of the paper, increasing control, governments have seen it appropriate to set up separate internal bodies (such as the auditor generals and the national audit offices) to demonstrate that they are subject to investigation. However, a further key argument of the paper is that, rather than providing an independent voice, auditor generals and the national audit offices provide legitimation to the original actions rather than a curtailment of these processes. The paper builds this complex argument conceptually and empirically. At a conceptual level it draws from a number of different literature bases to provide a 'middle range' (Laughlin, 1995) theoretical schema. This is then amplified and developed through an empirical case in connection with the UK's Private Finance Initiative (PFI). This case study is an illustration of the way pressure on the UK Government about PFI resulted in them becoming more and more politically accountable for this Initiative. This increased level of accountability led, in turn, to an increase in control over how PFI deals should be decided. This controlling intent was, in effect, legitimised by the UK's Auditor General and the National Audit Office by their active engagement and ratification strategy of these processes. This case study provides both an amplification and development of the conceptual schema as well as a way of informing understanding as often occurs through 'middle range thinking'.
INTRODUCTION
Accountability, according to Boland and Schultze (1996, p.62) '…is the capacity and willingness to give explanations for conduct, stating how one has discharged one's responsibility'. It is this 'giving and demanding of reasons for conduct' (Roberts and Scapens, 1985, p.447) which is at the heart of the accountability process. Central to the discussion on accountability has been a distinction between 'managerial' and 'political/public' forms of accountability (cf. Day and Klien, 1987; Gray and Jenkins, 1993; Sinclair, 1995; Ahrens, 1996) . The latter is assumed to apply particularly to governments who are accountable to their electors for the authority granted to them whereas the former applies to managers being made accountable for the responsibilities delegated to them. Implicit in this distinction is a view about control. In the case of governments it is assumed that the direct control of the electorate is limited. On the other hand in the context of managerial forms of accountability there is an assumption that the person or being who delegates responsibility (often referred to as a 'principal') to another (often called an 'agent') can and has power to exert pressure over the performance of the latter. One of the key arguments of this paper is that pressure on governments can change the level of specificity of the nature of the political/public accountability that is offered but cannot provide the electorate with direct control of the day to day activities of governments. A second key argument is that governments have a unique role within society to exercise control and 'steer' societal institutions and organisations and that this role can be intensified through multiple pressures not least through the demand for increasing specificity in political/public forms of accountability. A final key argument is that the control of governments needs to be seen to be tempered to some degree, not least to try to reduce the pressure for greater levels of accountability by the electorate. This tempering is provided through the presence of and actions and activities of primarily the auditor generals and the various national audit offices across the world. Yet this tempering, we argue, provides more a legitimisation process for the original control intentions of governments rather than a change or challenge to these intentions.
We develop the elements of the argument both conceptually as well as empiricallyusing the latter to amplify the former through what we have referred to as 'middle range thinking' (Laughlin, 1995; Broadbent and Laughlin, 1997a) . Our empirical focus is how the UK Government has made itself accountable for the introduction of private sector money to develop the services offered through the public sector. This Private Finance Initiative (PFI), as this development is called, was started in the UK in 1992 under the previous Conservative Government but has been taken over, seemingly with even greater enthusiasm, by the current Labour Administration. PFI is highly contentious and this has created great pressure on the Government to justify its adoption. Political, forms of accountability with a rather general focus have given way to systems providing more detail of how PFI works and should work in practice. These demands have forced the Government to become more focussed in their thinking. Increasingly this focus has concentrated on 'value for money' arguments. The support for value for money analysis not only accounts for how PFI has been (or more accurately should be) operationalised but also controls how PFI deals should be determined. However, the definition of what constitutes value for money has also been problematic and contentious but has been greatly aided by the involvement and legitimising strategies of the UK's National Audit Office. This story provides an important empirical amplification and development of the conceptual set of ideas that the paper develops in an interactive manner that befits 'middle range thinking'.
Put simply our argument is that the public electorate do have accountability rights but not control over the behaviour of governments. Increased pressure on governments can increase the detail that is provided by governments by way of political/public forms of accountability but this does not increase the level of control that the electorate can exercise. Real effects can only be exercised in the election of governments. Governments have a unique role within society to exercise control rather than be controlled. Increasing levels of political/public forms of accountability leads to an increase in these controlling intentions and actions. However, this unmitigated power needs to be seen to be tempered by forms of seemingly self inflicted control. It is for this reason that auditor generals and national audit offices are in place. Yet our argument is that rather than supplying a critical evaluation these bodies provide legitimacy for the controlling actions of governments. It is the development of this conceptual schema suitably amplified through Private Finance Initiative in the UK that forms the content of the remainder of this paper.
To achieve this the following is divided into two substantive sections followed by a reflective and analytical conclusion. The first section explores the above three conceptual themes (on accountability, government control and government legitimisation) drawing the points together into a conceptual schema. This is then amplified and developed in the second substantive section, which draws from data about the value for money debate in the UK's Private Finance Initiative. This analysis provides not only an illustration but also an amplification of this conceptual schema. The reflective conclusion draws together the conceptual and empirical parts of the paper and raises a number of critical issues for future research.
ACCOUNTABILITY, CONTROL AND LEGITIMISATION (i) Accountability
One of the key, if not the key, assumption of economic theory is that the transfer of financial resources from someone (a 'principal' 1 ) to another (an 'agent') allows the former 1 For simplicity at this stage we remain with the term 'principals' and 'agents' but with some hesitation due to the heavy overtones of hierarchy, economic thinking and control which these terms seem to imply. It is however a convenient label for this paper to highlight the point that the voting public (some or all of whom pay taxes) to governments technically are granting authority to the latter to perform certain tasks on their behalf. They can therefore be seen as 'principals' and governments as 'agents'. Yet even though they are technically 'principals' they do not have anything like the control over the behaviour of the government 'agents' that the more 'normal' 'principals' in an economic relationship are assumed to have.
to have certain rights over the behaviour of the latter (cf. Gray, 1983) . This assumption provides the legitimation for the arguably questionable (capitalist) power given to the holder of financial resources. In the following we do not question this assumption directly but rather raise questions about the nature and level of the expectations and control that surround this transfer. Put simply, and using the language of charge and discharge, we could liken what is involved along a continuum. At one end is where the 'principal' transfers finance to an 'agent' for a particular broad purpose (a defined charge 2 ) which is left for the latter to define and account, according to his or her view of appropriateness. This encourages what constitutes the 'discharge' arrangements to be left entirely with the 'agent' to determine. At the extreme of this end of the continuum it is possible to envisage a situation where the wishes of the 'principal' could be actually ignored altogether and other forces drive the behaviour of the 'agent'. At the other end of the continuum the 'principal' can directly control the behaviour of the 'agent' who has no autonomy of action. Finance is transferred with clear and unequivocal expectations as to how the money is to be used by the 'agent', along with the nature of the actions to be undertaken and how the accounts of these defined actions should be made. What constitutes the 'discharge' is totally defined by the 'principal'. Whether this extreme position is actually possible and whether or not resistance would occur if attempted we will leave on one side for the moment. It is the dynamics of different positions on this continuum and the implications for the behaviour of the 'agent' which will be the focus of the following.
Whilst the autonomy of the 'agent' is recognised at one level it is seen as a problem which needs to be overcome through the use of contracts (formal or informal) and/or accountability systems. This is particularly clear in the economic contracts literature which, in different ways, is concerned with designing a range of alternative 'technologies of managing' (cf. Munro and Hatherley, 1993; Munro and Mouritsen, 1996) the behaviour of the 'agent' to follow the dictates of the 'principal'. Principal/agent theory in modern economics is dominated by this agenda with its assumption of the self-seeking behaviour of the 'agent' and the problems of hidden information (or adverse selection) and hidden action (or moral hazard). To principal/agent economists the answer to these 'problems' involves developing and refining the nature of contracts. Initially this concentrated on greater formality in the design yet more recently the power of informality and the use of 'relational contracts' has been emphasised. In contrast much of the accountability literature has concentrated not on contract design as such but on the power of different forms of accountability systems, amongst other accounting technologies, to attempt to ensure behavioural compliance by the 'agent'. This view is driven by a belief that if you know what the 'agent' is doing or planning to do then it may be possible to exert pressure to change behaviour. If you don't know you can't change is the dictum of this thinking.
There is, however, a recognition at the heart of the accountability literature that acknowledges this aspiration for control is problematic. This relates to the important distinction that is made between 'managerial' and 'political/public' forms of accountability (cf. Day and Klein, 1987; Gray and Jenkins, 1993; Sinclair, 1995; Ahrens, 1996) . The distinction is thoughtfully captured by Day and Klein (1987, p.26/7) as follows:
'Political accountability is about those with delegated authority being answerable for their actions to the people, whether directly in simple societies or indirectly in complex societies. Here the criteria of judgement are, themselves, contestable and reasons, justifications, and explanation have to be provided. The main issue in complex societies is whether the linkages between action and explanation are in place and, if in place, adequate to the task in hand: whether the channels of communication are operating and whether the sanctions are sufficient to compel a justification if needed.....In contrast, managerial accountability is about making those with delegated authority answerable for carrying out agreed tasks according to agreed criteria of performance. This technical process can, though it need not, be carried out by neutral, impartial experts.'
Political accountability is implied to be more open-ended and less detailed whilst managerial accountability is more closed and defined. This distinction is important since it, in effect, recognises that there are limitations on the controlling power of 'principals'. Adopting and accepting political forms of accountability is an acknowledgement of limited power over the 'agents'.
Political forms of accountability are relevant in the important debates about democratic processes and voting procedures. It is in these processes that governments can formally account to the electorate for their activities and allow them to decide, through the ballot box, on continuation or cessation of office and, by implication, the direction being pursued. This political form of accountability also becomes woven into what Sinclair (1995 p.225 et seq.) calls 'public accountability'. This is a more 'informal' mechanism which involves politicians: '….answering, through various mechanisms from newspaper reports to hearings, public concerns about administrative activities.' (Sinclair (1995) p.226). What is clear is that both political and public accountability involve the electorate as 'principals' in a more reactive rather than proactive role with the government 'agents'. Whilst 'principals' in this context are assumed to be in long term control their short term watching brief is recognised to be somewhat more limited. On the other hand managerial accountability is intentionally more proactive with an underlying desire to ensure 'agent' behaviour is compliant both in the long and short term. This is recognised not to be possible with governments.
However there can be different levels of both political/public and managerial forms of accountability. Stewart's (1984) 'ladder of accountability' provides a useful illustration of these different levels. The rungs of his ladder start with 'accounting for probity and legality' which reports that funds have been used in an 'appropriate' manner. 'Appropriate', in this sense, is related to legally acceptable pursuits defined by the 'principal'. This rung of the ladder could be a constituent part of either a political or managerial form of accountability. The next level is 'process accountability' which accounts for the details of the action processes followed by the 'agent'. The next two levels are 'performance accountability' and 'programme accountability' which, together, are intended to provide an account of the total work performance of the 'agent' in terms of the specific goals set by the 'principal'. These three rungs are normally associated with managerial forms of accountability but they don't have to be. It is quite possible that increasing pressure on bodies such as governments will lead to the provision of information which is similar to process, performance or programme forms of accountability. But there is an important distinction. Even if this is additional information is supplied it does not mean that the electorate can exercise any greater level of control. The structural relationships between governments and the electorate prevent this. Whereas in the case of relationships in which managerial forms of accountability prevail the increased information of a process, performance or programme form does have the potential to lead to increasing levels of control over the behaviour of the 'agent'. 'Policy' accountability (Stewart's final rung on the ladder), on the other hand, is rather closer to forms of political or public accountability but it could also have strong managerial overtones as well, depending on how it is operationalised. Given that policy accountability could either fit with political or managerial forms of accountability, and given the different nature of these types, it is difficult to see Stewart's 'ladder' as a simple hierarchy. Certainly process, performance and programme accountability provides more searching information than the probity and legality rung. However, the probity and policy rungs of the ladder could be used to provide a more general appreciation of behaviour.
Sometimes forms of surveillance (such as the different levels of accountability in Stewart's ladder) are not needed since there is a high level of trust that the 'agent' will comply with what the 'principal' requires (cf. Fox, 1974; Luhman, 1979; Zucker, 1986; Coleman, 1990; Armstrong, 1991; Fukuyama, 1995; Lane and Bachmann, 1996) . What is clear from Lane and Bachman's (1996) survey of different models of trust is that all, without exception, take as given the role of 'trustor' and 'trustee' with the former assumed to be trusting the latter to undertake defined duties and activities. Much of this literature gives particular emphasis to the problems involved if the trustee breaks the trust he/she has been granted since '..trust is risky because the trustor's expectations about the future behaviour of the trustee may turn out to be wrong ' (Lane and Bachmann (1996) p.368). The debate on trust, therefore, works within an assumption of the rightful authority of the 'principal' (the 'trustor'). However, that notwithstanding, it highlights the important point that the type of accountability relationship is dependent upon the level of trust (from the perspective of the 'principal') concerning the likely obedience of the 'agent' in fulfilling the 'principal's' wishes. This applies in both forms of relationships governed by political/public and managerial forms of accountability.
The issue of trust takes us directly to the important point for this paper that certain levels of control by the 'principals' over the behaviour of 'agents' are intended but they are not always realised. To recap and to put simply political/public accountability assumes a certain reactive role for the 'principal' whereas managerial accountability assumes a much more proactive role. Under the regime of the political/public accountability the 'agent' has expected short term autonomy but still is expected to be trusted to act in compliance with what would be acceptable to the 'principal'. But this may not be the case. Equally even with the tighter controls that come from the more proactive forms of managerial accountability, autonomy of action can be secured. Laughlin (1990 Laughlin ( , 1996 and Broadbent, Dietrich and Laughlin (1996) and Broadbent, Jacobs and Laughlin (1999) illustrate a number of instances (notably in the Church and in the professions) where both of these states occur. In the case of the Church, where financial 'principals' (such as the congregations) have only very limited (reactive) power and control, 'higher principals' have arguably filled the gap to guide the behaviour of the clergy 'agents'. The public service professions, on the other hand, have been subject to unparalleled pressure to redefine their activities according to new managerial reforms and direction from governments, expressed partly through greater levels of managerial accountability. In response, however, they have developed clever 'absorption' processes (Broadbent and Laughlin, 1998) to preserve the values ('higher principles') that they believe should guide their behaviour.
Governments are subject to limited forms of control apart from the time when they are voted in and out of office. Governments have a finite term of office (in the UK, a five yearly term) where they have to be judged through the voting processes of the electing public. Governments are, as argued above, undertaking considerable managerial actions and activities that are not subject to the intrusive power of managerial accountability systems. Because governments are seen to be subject to political/public rather than managerial accountability requirements, details of the managerial actions and thinking of governments remaining somewhat obscure to public scrutiny. When they are under considerable public pressure and, having exhausted all general forms of public accountability (particularly of a policy nature using Stewart's ladder), will they account in a way that is similar to those normally associated with forms of managerial accountability (in process, performance and programme forms using the language from Stewart's ladder). Even if government's are forced to fall back on forms similar to that which applies under managerial accountability regimes this is not an indication that the voting public has finally secured managerial control over the behaviour of the government. The public may have forced more information about what governments are doing but the context has not changed -they do not have managerial control over governments. The following section shows how this is due to the structural position of governments in the process of steering and control of societal institutions and organizations.
(ii) Government Steering and Control This sub-section argues that governments are forms of Habermasian 'steering media' (Habermas, 1987) . Steering is linked very directly to the role of the 'state' yet contextualises this understanding in a rather richer form than the state-based literature does. Hall and Ikenberry (1989) suggest that there is wide agreement as to how the state should be defined which they encapsulate in terms of three key elements: 'First, the state is a set of institutions; these are manned by the state's own personnel. The state's most important institution is that of the means of violence and coercion. Second, these institutions are at the centre of a geographically-bounded territory, usually referred to as a society. Crucially, the state looks inwards to its national society and outwards to larger societies in which it must make its way; its behaviour in one area can often be explained by its activities in the other. Third, the state monopolises rule making within its territory. This tends towards the creation of a common political culture shared by all citizens.' (Hall and Ikenberry (1989) 
The societally-enpowered institutional, geographically-located and rule-maker characteristics of the definition of the state used here capture well what Habermas refers to as 'steering media'. Our argument, however, is that Habermas' three tier societal model (lifeworld, steering and systems) provides a rather richer contextual understanding of the 'steering' state. This is not to say that the considerable literature on the nature and workings of the state are of little relevance. It has been suggested that there are three major schools of thought concerning the role of the state. Labeled 'liberalism', 'marxism' and 'realism', these lead to different views as to the nature and relevance of the state for societal functioning (Dunleavy and O'Leary, 1987; Held, 1989; Hall and Ikenberry, 1989; Poggi, 1990) . Liberalism and marxism leads to a very dismissive attitude towards the state apparatus albeit for different reasons. With 'liberalism' the state is an intrusion into individual liberties and only with its removal can freedoms be assured. With 'marxism' the state is assumed to be captured by a particular class and will fall and whither away when class conflict, driven by societal contradictions, leads to the revolution and the overthrow of the dominant (capitalist) class. 'Realism', on the other hand, acknowledges the relevance of the state apparatus and looks to the design of, as Hall and Ikenberry (1989) suggest, building on the thinking of Michael Mann, the 'despotic and infrastructural dimensions' (Hall and Ikenberry (1989) p. 13) of the state apparatus and power. The 'despotic' dimension refers to, in effect, levels of autonomy to act independent of the dictates of the body politic. The 'infrastructural' dimension is in relation to the intraorganisational arrangements to 'penetrate society and organize social relations' (Hall and Ikenberry (1989) p.13) . This depiction provides a link into a description of and the context for the state apparatus, which is central to the argument of this paper. However, our argument on this is that this can be greatly expanded through a Habermasian model of society.
Habermas (1987 p. 120) suggests we can '..conceive of society simultaneously as a system and as a lifeworld'. The lifeworld, to Habermas, is the driving force behind society and links directly into his view of the role that discourse plays in the nature, evolution and development of society. It is possible to think of the lifeworld as '….represented by a culturally transmitted and linguistically organized stock of interpretive patterns' (Habermas (1987) p.124 ). This he sees as divided into three key elements which he labels as 'culture', 'society' and 'personality'. These reflect the discursively formed understanding of our world, how we relate to one another and ourselves:
'I use the term culture for the stock of knowledge from which participants in communication supply themselves with interpretations as they come to an understanding about something in the world. I use the term society for the legitimate orders through which participants regulate their membership in social groups and thereby secure solidarity. By personality I understand the competences that make a subject capable of speaking and acting, that put him in a position to take part in a process of reaching understanding and thereby to assert his own identity.' (Habermas (1987) 
The lifeworld is not static -it evolves over time through discursive processes. Thus cultural reproduction occurs through forms of what Habermas refers to as 'theoretical discourses' for developing our understanding of the world, social reproduction through 'practical discourses' and formation of identity through 'aesthetic criticism and therapeutic discourse' (see Habermas, 1974 Habermas, , 1979 Habermas, , 1984 Habermas, , 1987 Held, 1980; Thompson, 1983; Laughlin, 1987; White, 1988; Outhwaite, 1994 for more details about these processes). In this sense the lifeworld is forever evolving as society adapts and develops its understanding of what constitutes 'valid knowledge' (culture), the nature of 'ordered social relationships' (society) and 'personal identity' (personality).
The lifeworld is the arbitrator for discursive disagreements but it is also the driving force behind the creation and functioning of what Habermas refers to as 'systems'. As an arbitrator the '….lifeworld is, so to speak, the transcendental site where speaker and hearer meet, where they can reciprocally raise claims that their utterances fit the world (objective, social, or subjective), and where they can criticise and confirm these validity claims, settle their disagreements, and arrive at agreements' (Habermas (1987) p. 126). The lifeworld, therefore, provides the 'benchmarks' for the 'validity claims' of 'truth', 'rightness' and 'sincerity' on understanding the world, social relationships and self. But the lifeworld is much more than an arbitrating force for particular disagreements. It is the guide for the design of particular systems of action. Outhwaite (1994 p. 69) puts the issue succinctly when he maintains that the 'main thesis' of Habermas '…is that societal rationalization is not, pace Weber, reducible to patterns of action orientations. But nor… is it radically separate from them, as system theory would have it'. Societal systems of action are intended to be linked to and directed by the societal lifeworld. As Habermas (1987 p.154) suggests 'the lifeworld remains the subsystem that defines the pattern of the social system as a whole'. Systems are, or supposed to be, a tangible expression of some of the more intangible communicatively agreed lifeworld elements. Or, as Habermas (1987 p.146 ) puts this relationship: '….action systems take shape in which specialized tasks of cultural transmission, social integration, and child rearing are dealt with professionally'.
The increasing complexity of society leads to a more and more complex lifeworld and greater differentiation and decoupling of the societal systems from this lifeworld. Habermas refers to this as 'social evolution' which he sees as a '….second order process of differentiation: system and lifeworld are differentiated in the sense that the complexity of the one and the rationality of the other grow. But it is not only qua system and qua lifeworld that they are differentiated; they get differentiated from one another at the same time' (Habermas (1987) p. 153 ). Yet as Habermas maintains '…the lifeworld remains the subsystem that defines the pattern of the social system as a whole. Thus, systemic mechanisms need to be anchored in the lifeworld: they have to be institutionalised' (Habermas (1987) p.153 ). This, however, does not occur automatically since as the complexity grows and decoupling continues the anchoring becomes somewhat distant. Given these circumstances Habermas introduces a third intervening level between lifeworld and systems -steering media:
'Whereas system differentiation in tribal societies only leads to the increasing complexity of pregiven kinship systems, at higher levels of integration new social structures take shape, namely, the state and mediasteered subsystems. In societies with a low degree of differentiation, systemic interconnections are tightly interwoven with mechanisms of social integration; in modern societies they are consolidated and objectified into norm-free structures. Members behave toward formally organized action systems, steered via processes of exchange and power, as toward a block of quasi-natural reality; within these media-steered subsystems society congeals into a second nature. Actors have always been able to sheer off from an orientation to mutual understanding, adopt a strategic attitude, and objectify normative contexts into something in the objective world, but in modern societies, economic and bureaucratic spheres emerge in which social relations are regulated only via money and power.' (Habermas (1987) 
Habermas ' (1996) more recent work on the theory of law introduces a considerable development in the nature of steering media and mechanisms. This work brings not only a level of institutionalisation to the steering media but introduces public law as the steering mechanism which has a superior and guiding role to Habermas' previous understanding of the regulatory mechanisms of money and power. It is the institution of the law (and in effect the governments who enact these laws) and resulting public laws in particular, which, to Habermas, are the steering media and mechanism par excellence. It is only through the legal medium that money and power gain position yet, to Habermas, the law is always pre-eminent and foundational since it: '….functions as a hinge between system and lifeworld' (Habermas (1996) p. 56). To Habermas '..normatively substantive messages can circulate throughout society only in the language of law' (Habermas (1996) p. 56 (emphasis in the original)). Our view is that despite the greater levels of sophistication Habermas' 'legal turn' brings to understanding steering processes, it still does not go far enough in appreciating the range of mechanisms governments have at their disposal to steer. We will pursue this point below but rather than be drawn into a critical commentary at this stage there is one further issue of Habermas' model which does need to be briefly recounted.
The 'internal colonisation of the lifeworld' (Habermas (1987) p.332 et seq.) takes the decoupling of lifeworld and systems and, from a societal viewpoint, failure of the steering media, to new levels of understanding:
'The thesis of internal colonization states that the subsystems of the economy and state become more and more complex as a consequence of capitalist growth and penetrate ever deeper into the symbolic reproduction of the lifeworld' (Habermas (1987) p.367).
There is some vagueness in Habermas' understanding of whether this colonisation process is system or steering media led although closer investigation into the example he gives (legal juridification) suggests it is the latter. His focus is on family law and his conclusion is that legal penetration into this area formalises relationships in family and school. This generates '…..for those concerned an objectivization and removal from the lifeworld of (now) formally regulated social interaction in family and school. As legal subjects they encounter one another in an objectivizing, success-oriented attitude' (Habermas (1987) p.369) . In this sense the steering media (the government legal process) through its legal mechanisms, originally set up to ensure systems adequately express the lifeworld, come to express different values and lead systems into new forms of activity. Together these lead, in different ways, to the 'internal colonisation' of the lifeworld and what Habermas refers to as 'loss of meaning' at the cultural (valid knowledge) level, to 'anomie' at the societal (ordered social relations) level and 'psychopathologies' at the personality (subjective) level.
Whilst this model of society is powerful, allowing movement and change, it is not without its practical and application problems. Our argument (cf. Broadbent, Laughlin and Read, 1991; Laughlin and Broadbent, 1993; Power and Laughlin, 1996) is that these problems can be overcome by some refinement to the models that are being put forward but in such a way that the essence of the original can be retained -and not only retained, but enhanced. There are two refinements that need to be introduced. First, the need to recognise formally an institutional and organisational emphasis in steering and systems design, which, in turn, can be depicted as having their own lifeworlds, steering and systems. Second, and in this context, to widen the steering mechanisms that can be used to regulate systems behaviour, paying particular emphasis to accounting processes.
On the first of these refinements the argument of Laughlin (1987) and Broadbent, Laughlin and Read (1991) is that steering media are societal institutions and systems are societal organisations. Societal institutions have been specifically set up to steer, guide and regulate the behaviour of other societal organisations. The prime example of these institutions is government. Governments are there to steer -that is their societal fuction. In this sense any actions they pursue, including forms of accountability, will express their primary societal function. These are distinguished by Broadbent et al with those actual organisations who are steered (constituting the societal organizational systems to which Habermas refers). This slight refinement helps to make Habermas model rather more grounded and empirical and assists the development of tracing the relationship between societal steering 'institutions' and societal 'organisations' as well as their collective linkage to the societal lifeworld. Habermas' model, suitably refined, helps to illustrate the structural positioning of both societal institutions and organisations. The latter are intended to reflect the tangible expression of part of the (intangible) societal lifeworld and the former are meant to guide the behaviour of these latter societal organisations for this purpose.
However, the thesis of the internal colonisation of the lifeworld reminds us that this pattern of behaviour of institutions and organisations is far from certain empirically. The argument of Broadbent, Laughlin and Read (1991 p. 7/8) is that the possibility for this movement is because of their potential independence and autonomy due to having their own respective lifeworlds, steering processes and systems. Thus within each institution and organisation are similar functionally definable elements as suggested for society as a whole. As Laughlin (1991) indicates it might be appropriate to call these elements, interpretive schemes (instead of lifeworlds), design archetypes (instead of institutional steering media) and sub-systems (instead of societal organisations) to link the language more directly to those more familiar with organisational analysis. But the basic nature, albeit at a more localised level, is just the same. Labels apart, this refinement opens up the possibility that the internal colonisation of the lifeworld can also occur at an institutional and organisation level where the design archetype 'gets out of hand' and guides the tangible sub-systems in a way which leads to the undermining of the interpretive schemes. It also suggests that the institutional steering media may develop interpretive schemes that are out of line with the societal lifeworld, and may seek to steer in ways that are not societally amenable to substantive justification.
We now turn to the second refinement concerned with developing Habermas' understanding of the nature of the societal steering institutions. As indicated above Habermas has developed his own understanding of steering over the last few years. He is now clearly of the view that the law holds the key for making the normative requirements of the lifeworld via government legal steering processes into the reality of actual organisational systems behaviour. This tension between what he refers to 'facticity' (what societal system organisations are now) and 'validity' (the counterfactual, 'normative' of what they could be) guides his latest work (Habermas, 1996) . Yet as Broadbent, Laughlin and Read (1991) and Laughlin and Broadbent (1993) implicitly make plain and, as Power and Laughlin (1996) more forcefully argue, this is an unnecessary simplification and restriction on the nature of societal institutional steering media and the mechanisms that are used. Even within the law itself many complex legislative changes have a range of 'delegated provisions' (Baldwin and Houghton, 1986 ) which empowers, often government officials, to interpret particular provisions and implement regulations which, in effect, go beyond the formal Act. Then there is other government bodies who do not need the legal apparatus to undertake their regulative activity. It is highly likely that these bodies are working within a legal framework but are undertaking their regulatory activities distinct from actual legislative processes. Habermas' model has a tendency to exclude, or at least downgrade, these possible regulatory bodies. Our view is that they need to be included and treated not as secondary -the way Habermas seems to -but as of equal significance.
What this restriction does is over-theorise law and the legal instrument in steering and under-theorise other steering processes not least the economy, money and accounting and the institutions from which these emanate as Power and Laughlin (1996) suggest. What happens for Habermas is that he has to 'set up' other steering processes as very brittle and inevitably corrupt in order to give pre-eminence to the legal functions of government processes. For example, as Dodd (1994) makes plain, Habermas' appreciation of money is very restrictive and unitary. Equally, and following on from this, whilst Habermas has nothing to say about accounting, he nevertheless has an implicit and restrictive view of accounting as Broadbent and Laughlin (1994) , Power and Laughlin (1996) and Broadbent (1998) suggest. Arguably Habermas might see accounting and, given our focus in the paper, accountability as lacking as a steering mechanism. To Habermas the only 'pure' societal steering institution is government and the only 'pure' activity is the enacting of laws by this body. What is surprising is that in Habermas' great desire to find a 'pure' steering instrument he has firstly, downplayed his previous work on legal juridification (where the purity is clearly blemished) in his concentration on counterfactual possibilities and secondly, has given undue weight to only one means of steering. Our argument is that this is unnecessarily restrictive and built on a very limited appreciation of the nature of these mechanisms for steering. Laws, money and accounting are all used by governments to steer. All can be enabling or restraining. They all have the potential to be one or the other and it is not just the legal system that has this flexibility.
Perhaps in concluding this section we could stress three points that become clear from using this Habermasian framework. First, that governments (as institutional steering media) are in existence to steer societal organisations. Because of their role within the societal order it is likely that whatever they do will carry this societal intention and purpose. Second, that governments use not just laws as steering mechanisms to control societal organisations. Their use of money, accounting and accountability systems have similar power and similar controlling intent. Third, that because of the seeming legitimate power of governments and, because of the reactive rather than proactive power of the electorate to regulate government action (returning to the above sub-section on accountability), and their independence to act, then, on occasions, lifeworld demands may not be met and forms of colonisation might occur.
Governments therefore are and are expected to be powerful with a role to steer and control societal bodies. They need, however, to be seen to be acting legitimately since, as in the UK, the ballot box can vote them out of office at every five year intervals. It is to demonstrate legitimacy that their actions need to be scrutinised or seen to be scrutinised. It is here where the role of the auditor generals and the national audit offices become of central importance. It is to this that we now turn.
(iii) Government Legitimacy: Auditor Generals and the National Audit Office the UK Case This sub-section explores the processes through which governments attempt to legitimise themselves through the work of the auditor generals and the national audit office. Such a claim clearly needs some careful unpacking. It is difficult to do this on a global basis. It is for this reason the following concentrates primarily on the UK situation but touches on similar arguments that have been made by Funnell (1994a Funnell ( , 1994b and Funnell and Cooper (1998) in an Australian context. The Comptroller and Auditor General (C&AG) of the UK is a post which dates back over many centuries. The official title and role of the C&AG was defined in the Exchequer and Audit Department Act of 1866. This role was modified to a degree by the Exchequer and Audit Department Act of 1921 but developed further through the National Audit Act of 1983. Prior to 1866 the C&AG was made up of two separate functional roles: the Comptroller General of the Exchequer and the Commissioners of Audit. These two functions -part of the machinery through which Government expenditure occurs, yet the audit 'watchdog' over this expenditure -were brought together through the 1866 Act into one person and has continued throughout the 1921 and 1983 changes. The 1866 Act, apart from bringing these functions together, created a joint Exchequer and Audit Department (EAD) to support the work of the C&AG. This supporting Department was renamed the National Audit Office (NAO) in the 1983 Act. Our interest in the following is primarily with the audit 'watchdog' role of the C&AG and the EAD/NAO and the way this has changed over time, rather than the comptrollership function.
The C&AG technically reports to Parliament although, in practice, this is channeled through the Public Accounts Committee (PAC). As Harden (1993) points out: 'Parliament's function has always been to supply money to meet the needs of the Executive....Reforms completed in the nineteenth century created a regular and coherent system of public finance, by strengthening the control of the Treasury over spending departments. Parliament became the Treasury's ally in a system of financial control in which the Executive largely polices itself. Parliament's contribution is the Public Accounts Committee (PAC) of the House of Commons. The PAC was established (with Treasury support) to examine the accounts of government departments, just a few years before the courts refused to involve themselves in the task. By constitutional convention, the chairman of the PAC is a member of the opposition. ' (Harden (1993) p.18) The PAC and the C&AG are, therefore, in place to provide a watching brief for Parliament on the financial actions of the Treasury and the Executive spending departments. Together they form the 'eyes and ears' of Parliament to whom they, in turn, are accountable. To fulfil this wide-ranging brief the C&AG, as Comptroller, authorises the actual daily payments from the Treasury and, as Auditor General, provides audit reports to Parliament (via the PAC) on spending departments' financial plans and performance.
The interpretation of these arrangements following the 1866 Act, and until the 1983 change, was claimed to be less than challenging and searching of the decisions of Executive. The start of the reform came with the very significant study by Normanton (1966) . Published 100 years after the passing of the original 1866 Act, Normanton's study made a range of key criticisms of both the independence of the audit process as well as it's nature and coverage -points reinforced and developed through Funnell's (1994a) comprehensive study of the history of state audit. Garrett (1986) puts these two criticisms succinctly in the following way:
'Dr Normanton observed that, by international standards, our arrangements for central government audit were less independent of the executive than in any other Western country and were severely restricted in scope, coverage and expertise....the CAG was nominated from the higher ranks of the administrative civil service; the Treasury established the number and grade of the staff of the EAD and decided on the form of accounts.....In addition Normanton observed our audit was primarily concerned with the 'regularity' of expenditure (i.e. that it was properly used for the purpose for which it was voted) and with economy in expenditure and not with the efficiency and effectiveness of the spending organizations.' (Garrett (1986) p. 421)
The 1983 Act addressed both of these concerns directly. It gave de jure constitutional independence to the C&AG and endorsed that value for money (VFM hereafter) efficiency and effectiveness audits be undertaken by the C&AG if he 3 so chooses. Henley (1989) makes this plain:
'His complete independence of any constraint, actual or potential, by the executive government was assured by the substitution of direct Parliamentary controls on his budget for those of the Treasury. His establishment as an officer of Parliament, and the provision giving Parliament, through the chairman of the PAC, a statutory voice in his appointment neatly recognized his close relationship with Parliament without subordinating to MPs his judgement in discharging his statutory duties and the use of his resources. His long-standing commitment to value-for-money audit as a major part of his activities was endorsed and the 3 Es given statutory status......The change of name, from Exchequer and Audit Department, with its undertones of Treasury connection, to National Audit Office was more than symbolic of the ending of a long historical phase. It expressed a new outlook and a new approach.' (Henley (1989) 
The official NAO interpretation of this change in status is that, under the Act, the C&AG:
• may carry out VFM examinations in any department or other body where he is the appointed auditor or has rights of access and inspection by statute or by agreement
• may, with certain exceptions, carry out examinations in bodies which in any one year receive more than half of their income from public funds On his own interpretation, therefore, there is considerable technical scope for the C&AG to undertake any VFM investigation that seems appropriate.
However, even technically, some restrictions on freedoms of action were part of the 1983 Act. A specific provision was inserted which made an important limitation on efficiency and effectiveness studies, namely that they: '..shall not be construed as entitling the C&AG to question the merits of the policy objectives of any department authority or body in respect of which an examination is carried out' (Section 6 (2) of the National Audit Act, 1983). 'Policy', however, was not clearly defined in this restriction or how to do an effectiveness audit without some engagement with, in effect, defining objectives of programmes particularly when they are ill defined. As Garrett (1986) makes plain the 'last word' on this uncertainty was provided by the Chief Secretary to the House of Commons who maintained: 'if the CAG is saying "I do not understand what the policy objectives are" that is a different matter from saying "I think they are wrong". The latter he cannot do, but I do not see how one can stop the former' (Garrett (1986) p.424). The NAO's official pronouncement on this policy issue is that: '..the accuracy and completeness of the information on which policy decisions are reached, the means by which objectives are pursued, the implementation arrangements and controls, the costs incurred and the results achieved are all legitimate subjects for VFM examination' (NAO A Framework for Value for Money Audits (Undated) p.6) Whilst the Act did not specify in precise terms the nature of economy, efficiency and effectiveness the NAO have defined these in the following way:
'Economy is concerned with minimising the cost of resources acquired or used, having regard to appropriate quality (in short, spending less). Efficiency is concerned with the relationship between the output of goods, services or other results and the resources used to produce them. How far is maximum input used for a given output? (in short, spending well). Effectiveness is concerned with the intended results and the actual results of projects, programmes and other activities. How successful do outputs of goods, services or other results achieve policy objectives, operational goals and other intended effects? (in short, spending wisely) (NAO A Framework for Value for Money Audits (Undated) p.7)
The NAO are clearly aware of the difficulties of effectiveness examinations. They recognise that effectiveness has a 'close association with policy' and that there are 'particular problems in measuring performance or achievement -for example in assessing such factors as 'improvement in health' or 'quality of life'' (NAO A Framework for Value for Money Audits (Undated) p. 7). Yet this does not detract from, in effect, a constitutional obligation of the C&AG and the NAO to consider whether he should undertake these difficult audits. The obligation is that he 'may' conduct these audits which has the implicit implications that he will pursue this right on occasions when he so chooses.
The key question for this paper is the actual level of independence of the C&AG. Roberts and Pollitt (1994) and Broadbent and Laughlin (1997) posed two questions in this regard. The first was whether there was enough de jure freedom within the 1983 Act to allow the C&AG to conduct a wide ranging independent evaluation of Government programmes. Second, whether, de facto, anything like this had occurred or might occur. Both Roberts and Pollitt (1994) and Broadbent and Laughlin (1997b) conclude that de jure there is nothing to technically prevent this happening. Certainly Broadbent and Laughlin (1997b) were encouraging the exercise of this constitutional possibility as well as more ex ante forms of involvement to evaluate programmes before introducing them. However, whilst some level of ex ante involvement has occurred, as will become apparent when looking at the PFI value for money debate, this does not mean that this has involved an independent evaluation. Our conclusion, as will become apparent, is that the ex ante involvement was to work in partnership with Government to develop a view which could be formed (and legitimised at the same time) with the NAO's involvement. Whether or not this is a desirable state of affairs remain an important question but one which we will not be addressing here. Roberts and Pollitt (1994) were also of the view that this lack of independence would continue. A number of streams of thought led them to this view. They maintained that the lack of being able to investigate or challenge policy objectives was seen as a key problem in undertaking a wide-ranging evaluation that was suitably independent. Their argument was that the legislative restrictions on being allowed to question policy objectives were a serious reduction of independence. They also raise a further three limitations/concerns about this issue. The first is what they see as a largely 'self-imposed' restraint by the C&AG and the NAO. In this respect the audit reports have a tendency to be rather lacking in action requirements -a point also noted by Garrett (1986) . As Roberts and Pollitt (1994 p.546) suggest: '..the typical report format simply indicates that a particular aspect requires 'continued efforts' or 'further consideration' or 'review'. Thus the audited body is usually left with, as Roberts and Pollitt suggest, 'extensive room for manoeuvre'. A second limitation, highlighted by Roberts and Pollitt, is one imposed by the legislation that formed the NAO and the terms of the relationship with the PAC. What Roberts and Pollitt mean by this is that the '….scope of its work remains predominantly financial, so that management issues tend to be pursued only to the extent that their relationships to expenditure issues remains obvious' (Roberts and Pollitt (1994) 'More open-ended evaluations, however, would be likely to attract great controversy. To put it bluntly, a series of high profile evaluations of currently sensitive government policies could encourage the PAC to divide along party lines. That, in turn, would undermine the authority of the committee and, by extension, the legitimacy of the NAO. It could also enrage the government of the day which, ultimately, can usually control Commons business and the patterns and procedures of its committees.' (Roberts and Pollitt (1994) 
p. 547)
A further argument for the view that the NAO is actually there to legitimise rather than challenge Treasury actions is the thesis, put forward by Harden (1993) , that the PAC and even Parliament itself is in this position. Writing not only about the NAO but also about the local government 'watchdog' of the Audit Commission, Harden (1993 p.35) suggests: 'Parliament's role as a 'customer' or audience for public sector audit would be strengthened if its constitutional significance were not obscured by the myth of Parliamentary control over public money. Absent the myth, for example, it would be hard to understand why the National Audit Office should have a formal link with Parliament but the Audit Commission does not. ' (Harden (1993) p. 35) If Harden's understanding of the 'myth of Parliamentary control over public money', is true then the executive and Treasury's total power over the use of the public purse becomes absolute. Parliament, the PAC and the NAO are not there to challenge these decisions but they are there to provide legitimacy for this power.
Perhaps we could leave this section with a quote from Funnell (1997) who, having traced similar patterns in Australia, along with a continuing desire on the part of the executive for a 'stronger auditor general' concludes:
'The 'trick' is for the executive to come up with the means of creating a convincing case for the independence of the auditor-general without actually aligning the image with a corresponding substantive basis. In other words, the executive wants the auditor-general to act independently but not be independent. It wants the auditor-general to carry out his or her work of certification but does not want this to go beyond the control of the executive.' (Funnell (1997) 
p. 121)
Based on his comprehensive work on the independence of auditor generals (Funnell, 1994a (Funnell, , 1994b (Funnell, , 1997 Funnell and Cooper, 1998) over an extended time frame in the UK, Australia and to some extent Canada he concludes that this lack of independence is common place, of long standing and unlikely to change. The final sentence of the above quote is the real essence of one of the main elements in the argument of this paper -the auditor general is there to 'certificate' but only in a way which legitimises rather than one which interferes in the control or challenge of decisions by the executive. If Harden is correct this extends to explaining the function of the PAC and even Parliament itself in the UK. Whether this can stand closer investigation is less sure. However, it does seem that 'certification' is what is required as a role for the C&AG and the NAO certainly in the UK and, seemingly, Australia as well.
How this 'certification' is supplied is probably best illustrated empirically. As we will see in the case of the PFI this was not through the more normal ex post audit route but rather through ex ante engagement with an accountability statement which became a control instrument as well.
(iv) Summary: A Conceptual Schema
The above three sub-sections have looked at the accountability, functional control and legitimation of governments. Political and public forms of accountability are the primary ways governments make themselves accountable. This results in a reactive role for the taxpaying, voting public who must, in effect, wait for a number of years before they have a right to clearly express their views through the ballot box even though they may, through pressure, demand information on actions taken. Yet this is always reactive and considerable amounts of trust have to be exercised by the electorate. Managerial accountability has a much more proactive intention. 'Principals' use accountability systems to try to secure behaviour compliance by the 'agents'. These are not always successful. However the calls for more managerial information when the context is one where political/public forms of accountability dominate will not lead to increasingly levels of control by the electorate. Where and when accounting for managerial actions occur in this context it is probably driven by pressures coming from the outcry of the public on a particular issue but an increase in control is not the end result.
Where forms of public accountability do not suffice, an account that explains managerial actions, not dissimilar to managerial accountability statements, will be necessary. If these forms of managerial accountability occur from governments, driven by public pressure, the resulting account will not increase the power of the electorate but it will increase, through making things explicit which may have been implicit, the controlling influence of governments over the area of activity covered by the account. This is because of the unique position that governments hold within society. Based on a Habermasian model of society, governments are there to steer and control. They are given this authority and everything they do, including reacting to public pressure through forms of accountability statements, results in actions that have explicit or implicit control intentions.
Despite the seeming impenetrability of governments, generated partly because of the lack of day to day power of the electorate, but also because of their position within the societal order, they still need to justify what they are doing. Partly this is to avoid too many public accountability questions but also so that they can demonstrate to the electorate their trustworthiness. Auditor generals and national audit offices perform this function. Where, as in the UK, these bodies are seen to be too technically close to government then something needs to be done to demonstrate distance and independence even if, as we indicated above, this is an illusion. This conceptual schema of government accountability having a controlling intent which needs to be legitimised informs as well as can be informed 4 though the Private Finance Initiative (PFI) in the UK. It is to this we now turn.
THE PRIVATE FINANCE INITIATIVE IN THE UK: ACCOUNTABILITY, CONTROL AND LEGITIMACY
The seeking of private finance to fund public sector infrastructure and service developments in the UK has been through at least three historic phases (cf. Broadbent and Laughlin, 1999, Broadbent, Haslam and . We will, in the following, look briefly at these stages since together they provide an important contextual appreciation of what is now a significant, but nevertheless controversial, commitment by the current Labour Government.
Before 1992 the view of the UK Government was a mixture of wariness about the seeking of private sector money to fund public sector developments coupled with a great enthusiasm for wide-scale privatisation of major parts of the public sector. Technically private sector money could be sought as long as it satisfied certain 'hurdles' set down in what came to be known as the Ryrie Rules (after Sir William Ryrie, a Second Permanent Secretary to the Treasury). These Rules '…were regularly criticised for being too restrictive and giving public bodies no incentive to seek privately funded solutions' (Private Finance Panel (1995) paragraph 2.2, p.6). Given that the Government could always borrow cheaper than the private sector and did not have to achieve a return for shareholders, it was generally seen that any deals with the private sector had to be very special to get over these barriers. Needless to say little private money satisfied the tough criteria specified in the Ryrie Rules. The Rules were half abandoned in 1989 and fully retired in 1992 when the Private Finance Initiative was launched. Despite the ambivalence to private sector money through the Ryrie Rules no such hesitations were apparent in terms of a commitment to privatise large sections of the public sector. The 1980s and early 1990s saw an unprecedented period of privatising numerous institutions and utilities owned by the public sector. This was a central policy of the then Conservative Government led by Margaret Thatcher. The view was that the private sector was more efficient and could manage things better if they had complete control. So everything that could be sold, without too much of a public outcry, was sold, realising massive injections of money into the Government finances.
The second stage started in 1992 and ended in 1997 when the Conservative Government was finally defeated after 18 years in office. In the Autumn Statement of 1992 the Chancellor of the Exchequer (Norman Lamont) announced what he referred to as the 'private financing of capital projects' (Norman Lamont, House of Commons Hansard, 12/11/92, Column 998) and with that the Private Finance Initiative (PFI) was launched. He also makes plain that:
• 'self financing projects undertaken by the private sector would no longer need to be compared with theoretical public sector alternatives; • the Government would actively encourage the private sector to take the lead in joint ventures with the public sector; • the public sector would have greater opportunity to use leasing where it involved significant transfer of risk to the private sector and offered good value for money.' (Private Finance Panel (1995) paragraph 2.4)
The commitment to privatisation as a policy was not diminished at this time, but arguably there was little left that could be sold off without generating considerable public concern. It may have been this realisation which created the conditions to reverse views on what was seen as a less than attractive option prior to 1992. The Conservative Government's view, that the private sector was more efficient and effective and could teach the public sector a great deal, still prevailed. Again, it could be argued, that if privatisation was no longer an option any involvement with the private sector in public sector business was better than none at all. PFI provided this link. Throughout the reminder of the term of office of the Conservative Government they attempted to make the PFI a success. Many developments of the Initiative (not least the formation of a separate Private Finance Panel (from 1993)) were made. All were intended to provide an impetus to the development of PFI. At the Conservative Government's defeat in May 1997 some £7 billion worth of private sector money had been realised of which approximately £5 billion was in relation to transport schemes (not least the Channel Tunnel).
The third era started in 1997 and is ongoing. In May 1997 the current Labour Government was elected. After some considerable heart searching prior to the General Election about whether PFI was actually privatisation by the backdoor, the new Labour Administration adopted PFI with, surprisingly, considerable enthusiasm. Reflecting on this enthusiasm the Institute of Public Policy Research (IPPR) suggested three reasons for not only the Labour Government's enthusiasm for PFI but also for Public Private Partnerships (PPPs) more generally:
'The first of these was the political imperative of forging a new relationship between the public and private sectors -proving once and for all that the centre-left had dropped its historic ambivalence to the private sector and the profit motive, and showing that it could pursue its social exclusion agenda whilst enlisting the support of the business community….The second, and more substantive, rationale is the government's mission to improve the quality of public services….Securing this improvement -and closing the gap that has opened up in the public's experience of public and private services -was thought to require the involvement of the private sector. Finally, the use of PPPs helped the new government overcome a fiscal dilemma. In securing new funds without the need for upfront public investment the reformed private finance initiative allowed the government to reconcile the desire for investment in public services and infrastructure with its commitment to maintaining a tight fiscal stance and not raising income tax rates.' (IPPR Commission on PPPs, Working Paper No 3, 1999 p.2)
Within a week of taking office the Labour Government set up an immediate review of PFI with a deadline to report by June 1997. One of the key recommendations of this Review was to abandon the quasi-independent Private Finance Panel and replace it with a new Private Finance Taskforce in HM Treasury (i.e. in the heart of government). This was intended to give even greater impetus and power to the development of PFI both in terms of total investment and spread of involvement. Since this time PFI projects have been pursued in a much wider range of Government Departments (including key sensitive Departments such as Health, Education and Defence) generating investments to date of approximately £9 billion of private sector money.
PFI projects involve long-term contractual agreements between the public and private sector for the provision of public sector services by the private sector in exchange for an ongoing lease cost. So, for instance, in the case of PFI hospitals the National Heath Service (NHS) specifies the services that are required for a medical care facility and the private sector provide these services through a mixture of property and facilities for up to a 60 year time horizon in exchange for annual lease payments. The provision of medical care through doctors, nurses etc., however, continues to be provided by the public sector but everything else in terms of facilities, both of a property and service nature, are supplied by the private sector.
Needless to say this very different form of service provision brings a range of questions, surrounding its operation and success. It raises questions concerning the design and outworking of the contractual relations (cf. Broadbent and Laughlin, 2000a) . It also generates many accounting questions about asset recognition (in relation to whose balance sheet the property element appears) not least to avoid accusations of 'off balance sheet financing' (cf. Broadbent and Laughlin, 2000b) . Then there is the important short and long term question about whether PFI does generate benefits over time not only in terms of value for money but also according to criteria that goes beyond this perspective (cf. Broadbent and Laughlin, 1999, Broadbent, Haslam and .
These questions, however, have been accompanied by some rather more critical, negative and dismissive views on the worth of PFI. These have come from broadly four different quarters. First, involves groups who see PFI as backdoor privatisation with accompanying suspicion about the dangers involved in loss of public control over public sector services. This appears in many different guises and is often associated with left of centre views. Outcries about private hospitals, private schools and universities have been common place. A high profile concern that reflects this group would be the heated debates about the Public Private Partnership (PPP) planned for the London Underground. This has led to strikes by train operators and has been given high profile by the debate about funding the changes between the Mayor of London and his Transport Adviser and the Government. Second, are the public sector unions who are concerned about the protection of employment and pension rights for public sector employees transferring to the private sector under PFI deals. The provision of the services under PFI invariably involves taking over the employment of public sector workers (e.g. porters, cleaners, caterers etc) to be able to offer the services back to the original employer. Such transfers are complex and the unions have been very concerned about protection of employment and pension rights. Sometimes there have been good reasons for this concern, leading to considerable acrimony and strikes. Third, there are those who are very concerned about the costs of PFI and the benefits. There has been an ongoing worry as to whether PFI is actually more expensive to the taxpayer. Most vociferous on this front has been the ongoing attack on the PFI projects in the NHS. These are seen as not only more expensive but also are blamed for reducing bed numbers (cf. Gaffney and Pollock, 1997; Pollock. Dunnigan, Gaffney, Price and Shaoul, 1999) . The bed numbers issue is arguably nothing to do with PFI, being a government policy issue, but the cost challenges are real. As we will see this is central to the Government's accountability for and control of PFI. However, this is moving the argument along too quickly. Finally, there has been considerable regional concern about PFI. The UK has now three regional governments (in Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland). The Scottish Assembly has been extraordinarily dismissive of PFI. Their concerns are drawn from the above three areas but it is the only Assembly, for whatever reason, that is publicly opposed to PFI. Similar public outcries do not occur in either Westminster or Cardiff or Belfast.
In summary PFI is controversial. It is an Initiative that has a complex history. It was created by a Conservative Government but has been adopted with even greater enthusiasm by a Labour Administration. In fact the first law passed under the Labour Government was in relation to PFI (The National Health Service (Private Finance) Act of 1997) which was word for word the same as a Conservative Government Bill which ran out of Parliamentary time prior to the General Election. Whether PFI is a Conservative or Labour policy is an interesting question. Its checkered history has been accompanied by ongoing controversy about its worth as the previous paragraph has suggested. Together this provides a context in which certain forms of political and public accountability about the PFI have been insufficient to allay concerns. Greater levels of accountability on managerial thinking and action has been required and demanded. It is to this that we now turn and, as we will see, the resulting accountability has strong controlling intentions and needs and has been given legitimacy through active involvement by the National Audit Office.
At the heart of PFI is an uncertainty about what its major public purpose is. Put simply is PFI either 'a means by which to avoid public expenditure controls and thereby achieve investment that could not be afforded otherwise' or 'a public procurement approach that can yield value for money and risk transfer to the benefit of the public' (Broadbent, Haslam and Laughlin (2000) p.23). Even though there is clearly some overlap between these two purposes they lead to different emphases when it comes to trying to publicly account for why PFI is being pursued. The first purpose gives greater emphasis to the macro fiscal arguments for PFI whereas the latter concentrates on the more micro emphases. It is probably fair to say that in the early stages of PFI (from 1992 to 1997) the first (macro) reason was put forward for PFI. PFI was argued to be the only way to obtain new investment in a tight fiscal situation. The argument continued that PFI was an inexpensive way of providing this investment since it did not lead to increases in public sector borrowing. Public Accountability for the PFI in the period up to the General Election concentrated on this argument.
Micro value for money issues were raised but were left at some level of vagueness. So, for instance, in the Private Finance Panel paper in 1995 it was stated that:
'There are two fundamental requirements for a PFI project: i. value for money must be demonstrated for any expenditure by the public sector; ii. the private sector must genuinely assume risk. The significance of these two criteria differs depending on the type of privately financed project. ' (Private Finance Panel (1995) Paragraph 3.1 p.12)
In this context the simple principle on risk was that '..risk should be allocated to whoever is best able to manage it' (Private Finance Panel (1995) Paragraph 3.6 p.13). On the issue of value for money the view was, in the main, that competition would be the key determinant although sometimes the use of a public sector comparator could be useful:
'A critical question in deciding whether to go ahead with a PFI option is identifying best value for money. Competition is the best guarantor value for money. As a result of the competitive process, the best PFI options should emerge. These may involve comparison with a conventionally procured alternative -the public sector comparator. Certain kinds of PFI projects do not need a public sector comparator….This is an important innovation since the old Ryrie Rules, although it needs to be interpreted sensibly. Public sector comparators are not necessary for projects which involve no public sector money or which would not have gone ahead other than as PFI projects. ' (Private Finance Panel (1995) Paragraph 3.35/6 p.19).
Seemingly it was possible to make these arguments whilst the macro justification for PFI held. This justification, however, was increasingly under challenge. This was exacerbated by the election of the Labour Government and the change in the macro fiscal management arrangements. Debates on the Public Sector Borrowing Requirements (PSBR) were replaced by the 'golden rule' and the 'sustainable investment rule' for public finances. The result of this change has made the macro fiscal argument for PFI dubious in the extreme. However, it has taken until 2000 to finally dismiss this argument (cf. Robinson, 2000; Hawksworth, 2000) even though it has been under sustained pressure since the General Election of 1997.
Not only has the macro fiscal argument for PFI been under pressure but this has been intensified by challenges to the Initiative more generally. This has resulted in a growing need to justify PFI. With an inability to use macro fiscal arguments, focus has now shifted to micro value for money arguments with an increasing concentration on the need to use public sector comparators in this context. This has come through two interconnected routes -through Government policy statements and through the work of the National Audit Office (NAO). Our argument is that it is possible to see an increasing level of interdependence between Government and the NAO where the leader and the led is difficult to clearly discern. What is clear is that the latest Government policy, contained in Technical Note No 5 issued by the Private Finance Treasury Taskforce in October 1999, is something that the NAO either played a large part in forming and/or is happy to offer legitimising support as an appropriate strategy to judge the worth of PFI. However, before looking at this, in effect, joint statement perhaps we could initially make a few comments about the (seemingly) separate activities of both Government and the NAO with regard to PFI, starting with the latter.
The NAO announced on 14 December 1995 that they would be conducting value for money analyses of a range of PFI projects. As the press release made plain:
'The NAO's intention will be to demonstrate how departments have addressed the difficult issues of project definition and appraisal, the identification, quantification and sharing of risk, and the steps they have taken to secure value for money out of these projects for the taxpayer.' (NAO Press Release No 68/95, 14 December 1995) However, they then go on the make plain that '…..it is not the role of the NAO to express an opinion on the merits of the PFI, that is a matter for Government policy' (NAO Press Release No 68/95, 14 December 1995) . The NAO issued its first PFI analysis in May 1997 and then issued a further six studies over the next two years to May 1999. In August 1999 the NAO produced an unprecedented guidance about what it was looking for in value for money analyses. Before looking at this guidance it is worth noting that four out of the seven actual PFI studies concentrated on making judgements on value for money primarily through comparisons with a public sector comparator (PSC). The only reason that the other three studies did not do this was because the PFI projects involved would not have proceeded had there not been PFI, making the use of a PSC questionable at best. Yet it is clear from these seven studies that it was a PSC that gave the real base on which to judge value for money. That notwithstanding the tension between the presence of competition in the bidding process, vis a vis comparison with a PSC to judge value for money, was still present. Most studies were criticised for not being competitive but this became more of a passing comment rather than key in the value for money judgements.
The guidance contained in the NAO's August 1999 publication (NAO, 1999) focuses on '…four pillars which contribute to the overarching aim of getting a good deal in a PFI project'(NAO Press Notice, 13 August 1999). As this Press Notice makes plain:
'It sets out how to assess the value for money of PFI deals on a systematic basis using an analytical framework which covers comprehensively the key value for money issues which arise in these projects. The National Audit Office have consistently stated that they will not stand in the way of well thought through innovation and risk taking. Those involved in PFI deals will find that the National Audit Office's analytical framework will assist them in thinking through the key issues and should help them to make a success of the PFI. The framework and the National Audit Office's accompanying commentary, represents a comprehensive good practice guide' (NAO Press Notice, 13 August 1999)
The importance of competition in judging value for money is still retained but in a very conditional sense:
'Crucial to getting good value for money will be a procurement process which is as fully competitive as possible throughout the whole period of the procurement. It is not good enough for the procedures to be competitive in form; they must be competitive in substance………However the private sector are unlikely to be willing to compete strongly if departments are asking an excessive number of firms to submit bids and commit the substantial resources that the preparation of a full bid involves…..It will therefore make sense for departments to limit the number of bidders expected to commit substantial resources to submitting full bids.' (NAO (1999) Paragraphs 1.18 and 1.23, p.8 and 10)
However, no such hesitations are considered necessary for the use of the PSC:
'Finally as part of the planning of the procurement, departments should establish a public sector comparator against which they will be judging the bills…..They should aim to complete as much of the comparator as possible before receipt of best and final offers if it is to help in their assessment of bids….To establish that a deal is good value necessarily requires the procuring department to satisfy themselves that it is superior to their realistic alternative option or options. To do that they will need to carry out a systematic comprehensive, and thorough comparison of the PFI option against the public sector comparator.' (NAO (1999) Paragraphs 1.25 and 1.41, p.11 and 18)
As mentioned previously never before has the NAO issued a report of this nature. How they conduct value for money audits can normally only be discovered through an ex post analysis of the published reports. The 1999 Guidance provides ex ante direction on how the NAO 'examine the value for money of deals reached under the Private Finance Initiative' providing 'a hierarchy of statements expressed in terms of advice to the procurer' to 'make this project a good deal' (NAO (1999) Paragraphs 1.1 and 1.4, p.1).
In terms of the Labour Government's policy on the PFI there has been a slow movement away from the use of competition to now a total commitment to the use of PSCs to judge value for money. 'The principal evidence that value for money has been achieved is normally provided through the use of a comparator. However sophisticated the comparator it is important to remember that this process inevitably focuses on the factors that can be easily quantified and expressed in monetary terms. Other factors, notably risk transfer, service quality and wider policy objectives are less easy to quantify and may not be fully 5 reflected in the comparator…….With the Government now keen to use PFI in circumstances where it is the best value for money option, it will be sensible, in almost all strategic procurement projects, to produce a comparator to provide a benchmark to help make that judgement…..Whilst competitive tension can provide compelling evidence that the procurer has obtained the best available method of procuring the chosen service under PFI, competition is no longer seen as an alternative to compiling and evaluating evidence regarding the cost of other forms of procurement. Therefore the presumption should now be that some form of comparator is necessary for PFI projects.' (PFTT (1998) Paragraphs 2.2.1, 2.3.1 and 2.3.2)
The final move from macro to micro justifications for PFI and the complete concentration on the use of PSCs rather than competition to make this judgement came in October 1999 with the issuing of Technical Note No 5 (on 'How to Construct a Public Sector Comparator') (PFTT, 1999) . The Treasury Press Release made plain that the NAO had been actively consulted about the contents: 'The new guidance reflects the intensive consultation with departments, PFI contractors and the National Audit Office, whose reports on early PFI transaction helped clarify the issues on which such guidance was needed' (Treasury Press Release No 177/99, 29 October 1999) 'The NAO have been consulted during the preparation of this guidance and it has been prepared with the benefit of their experience of conducting value for money studies of PFI procurement.' (PFTT (1999) Paragraph 1.1.6)
The Press Release continues with a quote from Jeremy Coleman, the NAO's Assistant Auditor General in charge of PFI value for money audits:
'The public sector comparator is a key part of the financial evaluation of proposed PFI projects. The public sector comparator is an important guide to judgement on the overall value for money of a PFI project. In one case we have found basic arithmetical errors, but more generally experience shows these calculations can be difficult. The NAO therefore welcomes this new guidance from the Treasury on how to get them right. The public sector comparator should not be a pass or fail test, but needs to be seen in the context of a systematic evaluation of all the costs and benefits of the project.' (Treasury Press Release No 177/99, 29 October 1999) As the Technical Note now makes absolutely clear the '..key objective of public sector procurement is to ensure that taxpayers get value for money'(PFTT (1999) Paragraph 2.1.1). Any wavering views about the macro fiscal arguments in support of PFI have long disappeared. Competition too is also rapidly diminishing in emphasis:
'While competition ensures that the private sector will provide its most efficient bids, there is still a need to compare the best PFI option with a publicly financed benchmark. This allows the Accounting Officer to make a judgement on whether the client is likely to achieve value for money from a PFI project.' (PFTT (1999) Paragraph 2.2.1) However, the new emphasis on PSCs '…should never be regarded as a pass/fail test, but instead as a quantitative way of informing judgement' (PFTT (1999) Paragraph 2.2.3). Nevertheless, unlike previous attempts at defining the PSC, which have tended to say that items such as the transfer of risk cannot be measured and thus are excluded from the PSC, the Technical Note is more inclusive of the possibilities to take account of these items. This is nicely captured in the definition of the PSC: '…..as a hypothetical risk adjusted costing, by the public sector as a supplier, to an output specification produced as part of a PFI procurement exercise. It:
• is expressed in net present value terms;
• is based on the recent actual public sector method of providing that defined output (including any reasonably foreseeable efficiencies the public sector could make) and takes full account of the risks which would be encountered by that style of procurement.' (PFTT (1999) Paragraph 2.3.1)
The route to this point in the accountability for PFI has been long and tortuous. Yet the comparison with a PSC is more than an accountability statement it is control device for PFI decisions.
SOME CONCLUDING COMMENTS
There are a number of themes that are apparent from the above analysis of the Private Finance Initiative (PFI). It is a story of growing pressure to justify what continues to be a contentious Government Initiative. The PFI has traversed two different political persuasions. Ever since it was launched in 1992 it has been a controversial Initiative. As the pressure has mounted imprecise forms of public and political forms of accountability have failed to satisfy some parts of the doubting public. This has led, in turn, to some ongoing uncertainty in the search for greater levels of precision about whether to justify PFI on macro fiscal or micro value for money terms. In the early days the macro fiscal argument was advanced but, with a change of Government and changing fiscal arrangements, this became a less and less secure base on which to build a justification. In fact, concentrating on this argument was probably one of the factors that added to the growing pressure on the Government to provide a meaningful justification for why it was pursuing PFI. At this point a greater emphasis on micro value for money emerged, firstly, in relation to demonstrating competitive processes but more recently, and more intently, on the use of Public Sector Comparators (PSCs). All arguments to justify PFI have led to control mechanisms for PFI. When political forms of accountability were in operation in terms of a macro fiscal argument for PFI the control intentions were more diffuse. However, with the shift to more precise forms of public accountability for PFI the control intentions have become more transparent. Without the pressure it is possible that this thinking might not have achieved the focus it has. That notwithstanding, it is now clear that if a PFI deal does not satisfy the value for money criteria in comparison with a PSC then it should not proceed. The control intentions are clear and unequivocal. The shift to the use of PSCs has been intimately bound up with the thinking and actions of the NAO. It is the NAO, through their value for money audits, who have emphasised the centrality of PSCs in making these judgements. Whether this has led the Government's thinking is a complex question which probably will never be satisfactorily answered. However, that notwithstanding one issue is clear: the Government in their adoption of a similar view to the NAO guarantees not only clarity of mind but also a certainty of support from the NAO to provide justification for this thinking.
This story is an important amplification of the conceptual schema that has been portrayed in the first part of the paper. In terms of accountability we have argued that the voting public does not have control over governments except at the point where they can vote them out of office. As a result the demands for accountability of governments is limitedwhatever is supplied is for information purposes rather than to allow the voting public to exercise control. The voting public can exert reactive pressure on governments and this will result in a political/public accountability response. In the first instance this invariably will not deal with the managerial workings on a particular policy (the process, performance, programme elements using Stewart's terms). However, increasing pressure will result in some of these elements being declared. Whatever is declared will, like all actions of governments, have a control intention. This, we have argued, is because of the unique position of government within society that is in existence to control and steer. We have used the thinking of Jurgen Habermas, particularly in respect of societal steering, to articulate and justify this argument. Interestingly, returning to issues about accountability, the greater the shift in detail supplied to satisfy the political/public accountability requirements, the clearer the control intentions become. Thus pressure from the voting public, leading to more precise forms of accountability, make the inevitable controlling hand of government more transparent and more real. However, for governments to be seen to be exercising unfettered control could raise even further challenges by the voting public. Bodies such as the auditor generals and national audit offices have been formed intentionally to give some check on this influence. Yet, for all manner of complex reasons, these bodies do not supply the independent check originally intended. Instead auditor generals and national audit offices provide a legitimisation of the control intent. However, to the extent that these bodies are seen to be independent, legitimate and trustworthy it is likely that the questions and pressures from the voting public are likely to reduce -that is certainly the hope and intention. This, in turn, would lead to a return to probably the acceptability of a less detailed form of political or public accountability to placate any residual concerns. The transparency of the control intentions, which are apparent through increased forms of accountability, would thus be reduced.
These complex general themes are all illustrated, grounded and amplified through the case of the PFI. In fact the discussion of this case has allowed the conceptual schema to become rather clearer. This is typical of 'middle range thinking' where the theory and empirics mutually and interactively inform each other. Returning to the case and linking this more directly to the conceptual schema we have argued that increasing pressure from the voting public about PFI has resulted in a shift to an increasing level of accountability and a developing notion of what PFI is. The shift from a macro fiscal justification to micro value for money criteria (initially in terms of competition to comparison with a Public Sector Comparator) is now key in defining the nature of PFI. This clarification has been generated largely through mounting pressure on what is a very contentious Government Initiative. The increasing clarification has sharpened and made very transparent the control that Government now exercises over PFI. The UK Government's view is that no PFI project should proceed unless it can demonstrate value for money in comparison with a PSC. This has been given its own legitimacy through the close involvement that the Government has with the National Audit Office in the formulation of this strategy. It is unclear in the final analysis as to whether the adoption of a PSC in value for money analyses has been led by the Government or the NAO. In many ways this doesn't matter who is leading whom. What is clear is that the NAO's involvement with the Government in propounding the value of PSCs has legitimised the use of these Comparators to judge value for money. This is a control strategy that has been sanctioned by a seemingly independent body. The intended impression on the minds of the voting public is that if both the Government and the NAO have come to the same conclusion independently then it must be the 'right' strategy. It is only closer investigation of the sort conducted in this paper where the interdependency between the Government and the NAO in the formation of the ideas becomes apparent. It is this realisation which leads us to conclude that the auditor general and the NAO provides legitimisation for rather than independently challenges Government views.
In conclusion the paper has raised a range of, in effect, critical comments about the accountability and control of governments and the legitimising role of the auditor generals and the national audit offices. Like all provocative claims the views in the paper are open to challenge and contradiction. They are claims, but ones we would argue are justified and can be amplified by at least the case study surrounding the accountability for the PFI. Whether other illustrations demonstrate the same conceptual framework must remain for the future and future studies to decide. We look forward to seeing further studies to see whether our thesis is borne out in these cases or whether the conceptual schema needs some modifying. Such an interactive development of ideas through further engagement with other empirical situations is one of the central characteristics and strengths of 'middle range thinking' which informs this paper. In the meantime if the ideas have even a kernel of truth they raise important evaluatory questions about the role of governments, the power of the voting public to control such bodies as well as the legitimising involvement of the auditor generals and the national audit offices. We look forward to that evaluatory debate.
